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:VENDOR'S PRIVILEGE AND FIRST MORTGAGE OF HOMESTEAD,
BUILDING AND LOAN, AND FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
Act 75 of 1964 has made a change in R.S. 6:766 concerning
the duration of effectiveness of the original inscription of a
homestead's vendor's privilege and mortgage. The new period
is twenty-six years, as compared to the earlier provision of
twenty years. When the general rule of Civil Code article 3369
was a ten-year period of effectiveness for a mortgage inscrip-
tion, the building and loan association had a special advantage
in the twenty-year rule. However, since the amendments of
article 3369 adjusted the duration of the inscription's effective-
ness to six years after the maturity of the indebtedness (where
more than nine years),' the statutory twenty-year period was
no longer an advantage and sometimes the contrary. Many of
the associations' loans are for twenty years, so that the new
statutory twenty-six year period is no more than the regular
duration for such mortgage inscriptions.
The original advance made by a homestead, building and
loan, or a federal savings and loan association is secured by a
vendor's privilege and first mortgage on the debtor's property.2
The same vendor's privilege and first mortgage also secured
subsequent advances for the payment of taxes, insurance, as-
sessments, and repairs.3 Act 348 of 1964 has extended the scope
of permissible subsequent advances within the protection of the
same original security; such advances may now be "for any
purpose," provided that the total indebtedness at any time does
not exceed the amount of the original loan.4
Insofar as these additional advances are concerned, the new
law provides that the vendor's privilege and mortgage does not
prime other encumbrances which were recorded subsequent to
the original recordation and prior to the making of these ad-
vances; however, this provision can hardly have much practical
*Professor of law, Louisiana State University.
1. First incorporated by Act 247 of 1940.
2. LA. R.S. 6:766; 6:835 (1950).
3. Id. 6:767, 6:835.1.
4. Id. 6:767.1; 6:835.2.
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significance because the new law also requires that before mak-'
ing such additional advances the association must procure !a
mortgage certificate that there are no other recorded encum-
brances against the property.
CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE OR VENDOR'S PRIVILEGE ON
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Generally, rights of a civil nature are protected by remedies
of a civil nature; thus, breach of duty or of contract will give
rise to damages, or sometimes specific performance. Occasion-
ally, criminal sanctions are also attached, to protect the civil
right by serving as a deterrent against the temptation to com-
mit wrongful acts.5 As a matter of policy, this should be a rare
imposition, and one would expect it to be limited to situations
where it is necessary to protect against likely abuse which might
be extensive.
Act 496 of 19646 adds a new criminal statute imposing penal-
ties up to $2,000 or one year imprisonment, or both, as a deter-
rent against the temptation of removing a building or structure
from immovable property subject to a conventional mortgage
or vendor's privilege. The act also covers any parts or items
which are so attached or connected as to be covered by the mort-
gage or privilege, and it applies only when the wrongful act is
done with intent to defraud and without consent of the creditor.
From the point of view of the creditor, it is always welcome
to get more protection for the security device he already has,
and even though it is not so uncommon to see a house being
moved from one location to another, one cannot help wondering
how serious and widespread was the evil for which the ordi-
nary criminal laws were insufficient and which prompted this
exceptional legislative protection.7
The statute says "any person," and presumably this com-
prehends the mortgagor or owner himself whose wrongful re-
moval of such things would not be covered by the regular theft
law but which would harm the creditor by depreciating the
value of his security. However, it may still be questioned
5. See Chattel Mortgage Law, id. 9:5358-5361 (1950); Vehicle Certificate of
Title Act, id. 32:710G, 710H, 710J, 710L.
6. Id. 14:219, by re-designation on authority of 24:253, although enacted as'
14:217.
7. See also the discussion of this statute by Professor Bennett at p. 42 izfra.
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whether there is enough justification for imposing a sanction
to protect one creditor's right while leaving to other creditors
only the protection of their civil remedies.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Act 397 of 1964 amends R.S. 9:5353 and 9:5356(A) by
increasing from fifty cents to one dollar the fee paid to recorders
of mortgages for each recordation, reinscription, and cancella-
tion of chattel mortgages.
Act 402 of 1964 amends R.S. 9:5359, which contains one of
the criminal sanction deterrent provisions of the chattel mort-
gage law, imposing penalties for fraudulent disposal or removal
of chattel mortgaged property. It would appear that problems
with reference to cattle are becoming more serious, because the
original single paragraph is divided into two so as to deal separ-
ately with cases of livestock. The striking change is that the
penalty for such wrongful conduct involving chattel mortgaged
livestock is increased from not more than $500 or six months'
imprisonment, or both, to a mandatory imprisonment of not less
than one year when the mortgaged property is worth up to
$5,000, one year and six months when the mortgaged property
is worth between $5,000 and $10,000, and two years when the
property is worth over $10,000. No maximum imprisonment is
stated. This is a departure from the usual criminal penalty
formula of providing for a maximum penalty which permits
flexibility in sentencing through the imposition of lesser sen-
tences in appropriate cases. The common penalty clause also
provides for the alternatives of imprisonment or fine or both.
In the statute here discussed, the mandatory imprisonment for
the stated minimum periods is unusual and appears to be unduly
harsh.
By way of omission, this act has deleted the provision which
made it evidence of fraudulent intent when the mortgaged prop-
erty was removed out of the state and any indebtedness due
was not paid within thirty days."
By way of an extending modification, the new enactment
changes the earlier text by including removal "from the loca-
tion designated in the act of mortgage" as well as from the
parish where it was located at the time of the execution of the
8. This provision had been inserted by La. Acts 1954, No. 391.
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mortgage. This change is included in both new paragraphs




For some reason, there appears to be a movement in the
direction of defining and limiting liability in building con-
struction. Act 183 of 1958, as amended by Act 84 of 1960,1
provided that (1) a contractor would not be liable for destruc-
tion, deterioration or defects which were due to any fault or
insufficiency of the plans or specifications made by somebody
else, and (2) the contractor cannot waive this exculpation.
Now, Act 189 of 19642 provides a series of different "pre-
emptive periods" for actions involving deficiencies in design,
planning, inspection, supervision, or construction of improve-
ments to immovable property, whether the action is brought
by the owner or by any other person. Although the stipulated
period of ten years is the same as that applicable under the Civil
Code, 3 the statute spells out the kinds of actions covered (in-
cluding property damage and personal injury) and fixes the
starting point for the counting of time in various situations.
The use of the phrase "pre-emptive periods" (instead of "libera-
tive prescription") is probably intended to mean an absolute
extinction of the cause of action by the calendar lapse of time,
thereby excluding any possibilities of suspension, interruption,
or renunciation which apply in ordinary prescriptions.
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Act 408 of 1964 added a new section to the Revised Statutes'
which provides that acquisitive prescription (Civil Code article
3458) shall not run against any levee district or against the
Board of Commissioners of any levee district.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 9:2771 (1960).
2. LA. R.S. 9:2772 (Supp. 1964).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3544 (1.870); cf. id. art. 3545.
4. LA. R.S. 38:295 (Supp. 1964), by redesignation under authority of id.
24:253 although enacted as id. 38:293.
